Maximum Pressure or Maximum Chaos for the Middle East?

The region braces for a volatile mix of bold moves, high-stakes diplomacy, and unpredictable consequences under Trump 2.0

May 25th 2017 | JERUSALEM AND RIYADH

If you thought Trump’s first term was a geopolitical rollercoaster, buckle up—his second term might be even wilder. The man who brought us “fire and fury” diplomacy, took out Qassem Soleimani and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi-like items on a to-do list, and referred to the Middle East as a “bloody sandpit” is likely making a comeback. And when he does, the Middle East won’t be at the top of his priorities—but it sure as hell won’t escape his wrath either.

As I and many others have said before: the Middle East is the opposite of Las Vegas—what happens in the Middle East doesn’t stay in the Middle East.

Trump has always been fixated on China (or at least he used to be), seeing it as America’s real challenge. But he also has other pressing matters to deal with—how much money European countries contribute to NATO, illegal immigration from Latin America, or making Canada the 51st state, to name a few. The Middle East, by contrast, is an annoying distraction, a headache he’d rather not deal with if he doesn’t have to. If he had it his way, he’d slap a “No More Wars” sign on the region, sell some arms to whoever’s buying, and move on. But the reality, much like a Mar-a-Lago classified document stash, is messy. Some problems—Iran, ISIS, and their proxies—simply refuse to go away.

Trump sees Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and ISIS as the same kind of problem—forces that threaten U.S. interests and need to be dealt with. He is, after all, the only U.S. president who has assassinated both the world’s most wanted terrorist and Iran’s most powerful general. If his first term is any indicator, he will continue to view ISIS and Iranian-backed militias not as separate threats, but as two sides of the same coin.

His “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran nearly crippled Tehran’s economy with brutal sanctions. We can expect a maximum pressure 2.0—but with maybe fewer guardrails.

The Iran he is dealing with now is in a different place than he left it in 2020.

Several key figures will likely shape Trump’s Middle East strategy, and they are not known for their restraint. Marco Rubio and Michael Waltz are two names to watch. Rubio, an Iran hawk and potential Secretary of State, also supports crushing Iranian influence. Meanwhile, Waltz, a likely National Security Adviser, has been pushing the PUNISH Act—a direct response to Iran’s attempts to assassinate dissidents on U.S. soil. He’s not the type to forget or forgive, and his approach to Iran will likely be as aggressive as possible. Together, these figures would ensure that a second Trump term might mean finishing the job, leading to the demise of the Iranian regime.

A key question for Trump’s second term is Iraq’s future. From my conversations with U.S. think tankers and officials, Washington sees Iraq as an extension of the Iran problem rather than a standalone issue. The belief is that Iraq is essentially an Iranian colony, controlled by Tehran’s proxies and used as a launchpad for regional influence. However, within Washington, there are two competing schools of thought on what to do next.

The Regime Change School believes the only way to solve the Iran problem is to topple the regime in Tehran. If Iran collapses, its influence in Iraq and the region would naturally crumble. However, Trump has never been a fan of direct regime change through military intervention. While he would likely celebrate an Iranian revolution, he has always been wary of committing U.S. forces to make it happen.

The Better the Devil You Know School argues that Iran’s security state is already compromised. They see recent assassinations—like that of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh—as evidence that Tehran’s internal security is fractured. Instead of pushing for outright regime change, this group believes the U.S. should exploit Iran’s internal weaknesses and ensure its leadership remains weak and divided. Their thinking is simple: better to manipulate a struggling enemy than risk complete collapse and the unknown consequences that follow.

Regardless of which approach wins out, Iraq’s fate is tied to Iran’s. Iran-backed militias in Iraq are a problem, but they are not Hezbollah. They don’t have the same strategic value to the U.S. or Israel. They are disruptive, but not an existential threat. This means a Trump administration will likely focus on Iran first, treating Iraqi militias as a secondary concern that will weaken on its own if Iran does.

When Trump returns, his first 100 days will almost certainly focus on Iran—not its proxies. If Iran-backed militias in Iraq keep a low profile, they might avoid U.S. retaliation (as some groups did in Syria). But if they escalate, they will face airstrikes, sanctions, and targeted assassinations as a warning. Meanwhile, some in Washington speculate that Iraq’s political trajectory could mirror Lebanon’s, where Iranian-backed factions recently suffered electoral losses due to rising opposition. If Iran weakens further, a similar shift could happen in Iraq.

I am cautiously optimistic about these developments. While a second Trump term could bring more decisive action against Iran, it could also trigger unintended consequences that further destabilize the region. Some might see Trump’s approach as reckless, but others would argue that his unpredictability and willingness to take bold action are exactly what’s needed to shake up a decades-old status quo that has left the region in crisis.

Another major geopolitical gamble will be whether Trump can persuade Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) to officially bring Saudi Arabia into the Abraham Accords. From an Arab geopolitical perspective, this is nothing short of political suicide. Israel remains deeply unpopular across the Arab world, and normalization with Riyadh could ignite a wave of domestic unrest that might even threaten MBS’s grip on power. For all his pragmatism, the Crown Prince rules a country where public opinion on Palestine is overwhelmingly hostile toward Israel. Even in Gulf states, there are limits to how much a leader can push against public sentiment. The Arab Spring was proof of that.

But here’s the paradox—if there’s one person who could make such an impossible deal happen, it’s Trump. He has an uncanny ability to make unlikely deals and is the only U.S. president who managed to get Morocco and Sudan to sign the Abraham Accords. His force-of-personality diplomacy—part salesmanship, part brinkmanship—could convince MBS that normalization with Israel won’t be the political death sentence many assume.

And, in an odd twist of fate, perhaps it won’t be as catastrophic as expected. The Arab world has spent decades playing it “safe” with anti-Israel rhetoric while stagnating politically and economically. Maybe “normal” hasn’t worked, and a Trump-led geopolitical shake-up is needed to force a new regional reality. Of course, it could backfire spectacularly and create instability on a level that makes the Arab Spring look like a minor political scuffle. But in Trump’s world, high-risk, high-reward is the only way to play.

Trump’s first term was like an action movie—high-stakes, unpredictable, and what some might think of as reckless. His second term? Think of it as the sequel. The real question is whether the Middle East finally gets a resolution or just another cliffhanger. Either way, I’ll be meeting with key U.S. officials next week to gather exclusive insights into how they see Trump’s potential Middle East policy shaping up. Stay tuned—it’s about to get interesting.